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THE NCAA'S INITIAL ELIGIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS AND THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN THE
POST-PGA TOUR, INC. V MARTIN ERA:
AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFERENCE TO THE NCAA
Abstract: In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
(the "ADA") to eradicate discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. In 2001, in PGA Tow; Inc. v. Martin, the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted the ADA to prohibit a professional golf association from
denying a golfer with a disability the use of a golf cart during competitions,
despite a rule requiring all competitors to walk the course. The Martin
decision has sparked questions regarding the application of the ADA,
including its application to the initial academic eligibility requirements of
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the "NCAA"). This Note
examines the impact of the Martin decision on future ADA claims
challenging the validity of the NCAA's initial eligibility requirements.
Specifically, after examining pre-Martin ADA claims against both the
NCAA and academic institutions and comparing two courts' inter-
pretations of Martin, this Note argues that in future cases challenging the
NCAA's initial eligibility requirements, courts should interpret Marlin to
provide the NCAA as much deference as courts continuously have granted
to academic institutions.
INTRODUCTION
For many Americans, college athletics conjure images of school
pride, "March Madness" tournament pools, and New Year's Day bowl
gamest Despite these positive images, however, college athletics often
are marred by controversy, at the center of which is frequently the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (the "NCAA"), the independent
I See JOE 1,LINAHDI, ESPN.coM, BRACKETOLOGY, at http://sports.espn.go.coni/ncl)/
bracketology (last visited Mac 15, 2005); ESPN.coM , COLLEGE FOOTBALL ROM, SCHEDULE,
at littp://sports.espn.go.com/ncl/scheditles (last visited Mar. 15, 2005); N k '4 COLLEGIATE
ATI ILETIC Ass'N, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE FOR NCAA SPoRcs, at littp://v -. , wort.s.com
(last visited Mar. l5, 2005).
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authority that regulates intercollegiate athletics. 2 In fact, the NCAA
continuously has faced criticism regarding the academic standards for
student-athletes. 5 On the one hand, some critics have argued that col-
leges and universities take advantage of student-athletes, exploiting
them for entertainment without concern for their educations. 4 On
the other hand, some have charged that the NCAA's academic stan-
dards discriminate against certain student-athletes with learning dis-
abilities.6 As a result, the criticism continues, the NCAA bars some
student-athletes from attending the college of their choice and, con-
sequently, may preclude them from. earning a college degree or par-
ticipating in intercollegiate sports.6
Although much litigation has arisen from this debate, the ques-
tion of the role of academics in college athletics remains unclear, es-
pecially in light of a recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion applying the
Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA") to a sport—golf. 7 In 2001,
in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a pro-
fessional golfer with a disability, holding that the ADA required the
Professional Golf Association (the "PGA") to allow the plaintiff to use a
golf cart in its tournaments, despite a rule requiring all golfers to
walk.8 That decision sparked controversy regarding the extent to which
courts should involve themselves in the realm of professional sports. 9
More importantly, however, Martin marks one of the most comprehen-
sive treatments of Title III of the ADA. 1° Although Martin is a land-
2 See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Academic Standards or Discriminatory Hoops? Learning-
Disabled Student-Athletes and the NCAA Initial Academic Eligibility Requirements, 66 TENN. L.
REv. 1049, 1068-69 (1999); Task Force to Examine Recruiting, NCAA NEWS ONLINE, at
ht ip://trcaa.org/ trews/2004/20040301 /active/4105n01.html (Mar. 1, 2004).
3 See Weston, supra note 2, at 1068-69.
hi.
5 kl. at 1123.
6 See id. at 1122-23.
7 See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 677 (2001); Cole v. Nat'l Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n, 120 F. Stipp. 2d 1060, 1071-72 (ND. Ga. 2000); Tatum v. Nat'l Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121-23 (F.D. Mo. 1998); seeAmericans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213) (2000).
8 532 U.S. at 690.
9 See, e.g., Martha Lee Walters & Suzanne Bradley Chanti, When the Only Way to Equal Is
to Acknowledge the Difference: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 40 BRANnEis U. 727, 727-31 (2002);
Jeffrey Michael Cromer, Note, Creating an Uncomfortable Fit in Applying the ADA to Professional
Sports, 36 IND. L. REV. 149, 149-52 (2003); Amy M. Kearney, Note, Not Like It Was in the Old
Days: Is the Americans with Disabilities Act Changing the Face of Sports as We Know It?, 10 Vim..
SPowrs & ENT. LJ. 153, 177-79 (2003).
m See 532 U.S. at 664-65, 674, 680, 690.
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mark case in ADA jurisprudence, the extent to which Martin will affect
future ADA litigation remains unclear." Most nebulous, perhaps, is the
effect that Martin will have on the NCAA—particularly the impact of
Martin on future ADA cases in which student-athletes with learning
disabilities challenge the NCAA's academic requirements. 12
Even prior to the Martin decision, a number of student-athletes
with learning disabilities challenged the NCAA in actions involving
Title III of the ADA.'s In those cases, the student-athletes alleged that
some of the NCAA's academic standards discriminated against them
in violation of Title III by denying them full athletic eligibility." Al-
though the courts deciding those cases differed in parts of their
analyses, most of the courts agreed that the ADA did not require the
NCAA to modify its initial eligibility requirements. 15 Since the Su-
preme Court announced its decision in Martin, however, no court has
reached the issue of the application of Marlin to claims involving ADA
challenges to the NCAA's initial eligibility requirements, and thus the
extent to which Martin will affect such cases remains unclear. 16
This Note argues that in future litigation involving the NCAA's
initial academic eligibility requirements, courts should follow the Title
III analysis that the Supreme Court set out in Martin." In doing so,
however, courts should provide the same deference to the NCAA's
professional judgment as to whether a requested modification would
fundamentally alter the nature of its privileges and services as they
provide to other academic institutions."' Courts should provide such
deference because, unlike the walking rule at issue in Martin, the ini-
tial eligibility requirements are academic, and not athletic, in na-
ture. 19 Therefore, courts should defer to the NCAA's judgment as to
Li See id.
12 See id.
11 E.g., Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 10136; Thium, 992 F. Supp. at 1116; Gamlen v. Nat'I Col-
legiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *1 (N.D. III. Nov. 21, 1996) (un-
published opinion).
14 E.g., Cole, 120 F. Stipp. 2d at 1066; Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1116; Ganden, 1996 WL.
680000, at *1, *5.
15 See, e.g., Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1071-72; Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1123; Ganden, 1996
WL 68(1000, at *15-16.
16 See supra notes 7-1 5 and accompanying text. A Westlaw search conducted on March
7, 2005, revealed no case law on Title 111 claims pertaining to the NCAA's initial eligibility
requirements.
17 See 5.52 U.S. at 688-89.
16 See Doe v. Haverford Sch., No. Civ.A. 03-3989, 2003 WL 22097782, at *8 (ED. Pa.
Aug. 5, 2003) (unpublished opinion).
19 Compare Martin, 532 U.S. at 690 (discussing the relevance of the walking rule to the
game of golf), with Doe, 2903 WL 22097782, at *8 (discussing academic rs.litirements).
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whether a requested modification would lower its academic standards
in the same way that courts repeatedly have deferred to the judgments
of other academic institutions in similar cases."
Part I of this Note provides background on the ADA. 21 It first dis-
cusses the statute itself and then outlines the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the ADA in Martin.22 Part II of this Note discusses the
NCAA. 23 In addition to explaining the NCAA's goals as the regulatory
body in charge of intercollegiate athletics, Part H explains the NCAA's
initial eligibility requirements for incoming student-athletes." Part II
also describes Title III claims involving the NCAA's initial eligibility
requirements that courts resolved before the Supreme Court an-
nounced the Martin decision." Part HI compares two courts' interpre-
tations of the Martin decision. 26 One case discussed in Part III involves
a Title III claim filed against the NCAA resulting from one of its aca-
demic requirements. 27 The other case, which involves a Title III claim
filed against a private school, illustrates an application of Martin that
called for some deference toward the school's professional judg-
ment.28 Part IV outlines additional cases in which courts have de-
ferred to the professional judgment of academic institutions." Part V
provides an analysis of the application of Martin to future Title III
claims involving the NCAA's initial eligibility requirements." It con-
chides that Title III applies to the NCAA and suggests that in future
cases, courts should provide the same deference to the NCAA that
they afford to other academic institutions when applying the Marlin
standard to Title III claims.31
n See, e.g., Doe, 2003 WE- 22097782, at *8.
21 See infra notes 32-84 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 32-84 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 85-154 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 87-129 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 130-154 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 155-207 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 163-187 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 188-207 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 208-224 and accompanying (ext.
30 See infra notes 225-304 and accompanying text.
si See infra notes 248-304 and accompanying text.
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I. TILE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: THE STATUTE,
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF ITS
REQUIREMENTS IN PGA TOUR, INC. V. MARTIN, AND
THE DEBATE SURROUNDING THE DECISION
Aimed at eliminating discrimination against individuals with dis-
abilities, the ADA has exerted its influence in many areas of American
society, including athletics. 32 In fact, athletes with disabilities at all lev-
els, from interscholastic to professional, have used the ADA to request
waivers of athletic rules that would otherwise prevent them from par-
ticipating in sports." The results of those cases have been mixed, de-
pending mostly on the circumstances of the plaintiffs, the athletic
programs, and the nature of the requested waivers." One fact seems
clear, however—athletic governing bodies can no longer unreasona-
bly discriminate against athletes with disabilities. 35
A. Summary of the ADA
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA to protect individuals with
disabilities from discrimination. 36 Having found that individuals with
disabilities continually had faced unnecessary discrimination, Con-
gress stated that a purpose of the ADA is "to provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities." 37 To that end, Congress granted
individuals with disabilities a private right of action against specified
public and private entities that unfairly discriminate against them."
Additionally, Congress broadly defined "disability" for the purposes of
the ADA as having, having "a record" of having, or "being regarded as
32 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000); see, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 680, 690
(2001); Cole v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 120 F. Stipp. 2d 1060, 1071-72 (N.D. Ca.
2000); Tatum v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass' it, 992 F. Stipp. 1114, 1121-23 (ED. Mo. 1998).
" See Jonathan R. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Its Application to High
School, Collegiate and Professional Athletics, ti VIL.L. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 243, 249-63 (1999)
(summarizing suits that athletes with disabilities brought against high school, collegiate,
and professional sports governing bodies).
34 See, e.g., Cole, 120 F. Stipp. 2d at 1066-67, 1072; Tatum, 992 F. Stipp. at 1116-19,
1123-24; Butler v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. C96-1656D, 1996 Wl. 1058'233, *1
(W.D. Wash. No 8, 1996) (unpublished Opinion).
55 See Martin, 532 U.S. at 688-91.
36 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
37 Id. § 12101(a)-(b)(1).
" Id. § 12188 (providing remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a)).
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having" "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of [an] individual."39
In addition to defining key terms and stating the statute's pur-
pose, Title I of the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating
against qualified employees with disabilities on the basis of their dis-
abilities.4° Similarly, Title II of the ADA prevents public entities—state
and local governments and their agencies—from denying a qualified
individual with a disability that entity's privileges or benefits or other-
wise discriminating against that individual because of disability.'" Ti-
tles IV and V of the ADA pertain to telecommunications services and
address other miscellaneous provisions. 42
Title III of the ADA is the section under which most plaintiffs
bring claims against athletic governing bodies. 43 Title III prohibits
places of public accommodation from discriminating against or pro-
viding unequal benefits to individuals with disabilities, including using
eligibility requirements that "screen out or tend to screen out" indi-
viduals with disabilities." Specifically, Title III states that "[n]o indi-
vidual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommoda-
tion by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place
of public accommodation."43 Although private clubs and religious or-
ganizations arc exempt from coverage under Title III, the ADA's
definition of places of public accommodation includes private entities
serving as places of public gathering and public recreation, such as
parks, schools, and gymnasia.46
Title [II also requires places of public accommodation to make
reasonable modifications to policies or procedures necessary for an
39 Id. § 12102(2).
4° Id. § 12112. A "qualified individual with a disability" is one "who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment posi-
tion that such individual holds or desires." Id. § 121 1 1 (8).
41 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ibtlild Ti-
tle 11 unconstitutional in particular circumstances but that decision is not relevant to this
Note. See l'opovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3t1 808, 810-11 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002).
42 47 U.S.C. § 225; 42 U.S.C. § 12201.
45 42 U.S.C:. § 12182; see, e.g., Cole, 120 F. Stipp. 2d at 1066; Tatum, 992 F. Stipp. at 1116;
Gamlen v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'ii, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
No 21, 1996) (unpublished opinion).
44 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)-(b) (2) (A).
45 Id. § 12182(a).
46 Id. § 12181.
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individual with a disability to access the entity's goods or services, unless
the entity can show that such an accommodation "would fundamentally
alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations."47 Put differently, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving (1) that a requested modification would be necessary for the
individual with a disability to access the place of public accommoda-
tion's goods or services and (2) that the requested modification would
be reasonable under the circumstances." After the plaintiff has pro-
vided prima fade evidence as to those two issues, the entity may assert
the affirmative defense that the requested modification would not be
reasonable, and therefore not required by Title III, because it. would
fundamentally alter the nature of its goods or services."
B. The ADA as Applied to Professional Golf PGA Tour, Inc. v, Martin
In 2001, in PGA Miff, Inc. v. Martin, the U.S. Supreme Court ap-
plied the ADA to professional athletics and ruled that the ADA pro-
tected a qualified golfer with a disability's access to professional golf
tournaments and that his use of a golf cart would not fundamentally
alter the nature of the tournaments despite a rule requiring all golfers
to walk the course," At the heart of the case was Casey Martin, a tal-
ented golfer suffering from a degenerative circulatory disorder that
caused atrophy in his right leg, extreme pain, and a risk of additional
injury when he walked.51 Therefore, because Martin's disability "'sub-
stantially limit[ed] '" walking, a "'major life activit[y]," he qualified as
an individual with a disability protected by the ADA. 52 Despite his dis-
ability, Martin had an accomplished golf career, winning amateur and
collegiate tournaments and earning admission into the PGA's profes-
sional golf tournaments."
The PGA, defendant in the suit, is a nonprofit organization that
sponsors professional golf tournaments conducted on annual tours,"
The PGA holds its tournaments at golf courses that it leases and oper-
ates for the duration of the specific events. 55 The "hard card," the golf
47 Id. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii).
48 See id.
49 See 42 U.S.G. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii).
50 532 U.S. at 664,676-91.
51 Id. at 667-69.
52 Id. at 668 & n.7 (quoting 42 U.S.0 § 12102).
51 Id. at 667-68.
54 Id. at 665.
55 Martin, 532 U.S. at 665.
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rules that govern PGA tours, requires golfers to walk the courses during
most tournaments.56
 Although Martin requested that the PGA waive
that rule for him, the PGA refused, and thus Martin filed suit under
Title HI of the ADA, seeking a waiver of the PGA's walking rule. 57
In response to Martin's complaint, the district court granted him
a preliminary injunction that allowed him to use a golf cart for certain
competitions 5a The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, finding that the golf courses were places of public accom-
modation and that providing Martin with the use of a cart would not
fundamentally alter the nature of the tours, but rather would simply
provide him access to a competition that his disability would otherwise
have prevented him from entering. 59
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in part to resolve a circuit split involving the appli-
cation of Title III to professional goIf. 69 Specifically, just one day after
the Ninth Circuit ruled in Martin's favor in 2000, in Olinger v. United
States Golf Ass'n, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit de-
nied a golfer with a disability's request for a waiver of a professional
golf association's walking rule. 6 ' In Olinger, the court assumed, with-
out deciding, that Title III applied to the U.S. Golf Association but
denied the plaintiff's modification request because it would funda-
mentally alter the nature of the competition by removing stamina as a
quality to be tested in the tournament. 62
The Supreme Court resolved the split first by holding that Title
III applied to the PGA 65 The Court noted that the PGA's tours oc-
curred on golf courses—places of public accommodation specifically
mentioned in Title III—and that the PGA leased and operated the
golf courses during its competitions.64 Therefore, the Court held that
Title III prohibited the PGA as an operator of places of public ac-
56 Id. at 666-67. Golfers are permitted to use golf' carts during qualifying rounds and
on the Senior PGA Tour, which is limited to players fifty years old or older, though most of
the competitors prefer to walk. Id. at 667.
57 Id. at 669.
5" Id. at 672.
"" Id. at 672-73.
6° Martin, 532 U.S. at 674.
Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001,1007 (7th Cir. 2000); see Martin,
532 U.S. at 674.
62 205 F.3d at 1005-07.
65 Martin, 532 U.S. at 676-77.
64 Id.
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commodation from discriminating against an individual with a disabil-
ity in the full enjoyment of its facilities and privileges. 65
Having found that Title III applied to the PGA, the Court next
ruled that the PGA discriminated against Martin in a mariner prohib-
ited by Title III by not providing him with a reasonable and necessary
modification—that is, by disallowing him to ride in a golf cart.° The
Court explained that Title III requires an individual inquiry into the
circumstances of the case to determine whether the requested
modification would be necessary and reasonable under the circum-
stances without constituting a fundamental alteration.67 The PGA did
not contest that Martin's use of a golf cart would constitute a reason-
able modification necessary for him to participate in its tourna-
ments. 68 Rather, the PGA raised the affirmative defense that Title III
did not require the requested -Modification to the walking rule be-
cause it would fundamentally alter the nature of the competition.°
To analyze the PGA's fundamental alteration defense, the Court
announced a two-pronged test." The Court reasoned that the re-
quested modification could constitute a fundamental alteration in two
ways. 71 First, the modification could alter an aspect of the game so es-
sential that even if the modification applied to all participants, the
result would be unacceptable. 72 Second, a modification to a rule, even
one peripheral to the game, could fundamentally alter a competition
by providing to the golfer with a disability a competitive advantage
" Id. Responding to the PGA's argument that Title III did not apply to its tours he-
cause professional golfers were not members of the class of clients and customers that Tide
III protects, but rather more closely resembled the class of employees that Title I protects,
the Court held that Tide Ill applied to the PGA because it offered at least two "privileges"
to the public—playing in and watching its competitions. Id. at 679-80. The Court thus
reasoned that competitors in the l'GA's tournaments were as much "clients or customers"
of the PGA as spectators and thus protected by Title 111 because members of the public
may enter the tournaments through open qualifying rounds and a qualifying tournament,
admission to which required only letters of recommendation and a fee. See id.
66 Id. at 682-91.
67 Id.
" Martin, 532 U.S. at 682.
6° Id.
7° Id. at 682-83. If Marlin's affliction simply made walking difficult or painful, using a
golf cart would be a reasonable, but possibly unnecessary, accommodation. See id. at 682.
Although the parties resolved that question by not contesting the reasonableness or neces-
sity of the golf cart, that illustration shows that courts must conduct a factual inquiry into
the nature of the disability, and presumably, the nature of the requested modif ication. See id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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over the other competitors." Applying the facts of the Martin case to
that test, the Court concluded that Martin's use of a cart would not
fundamentally alter PGA tournaments in either of those ways, and
thus would not be an unreasonable modification. 74
To reach that conclusion, the Court first held that the walking
rule was peripheral to the rules of golf, explaining that walking was
not such a fundamental aspect of golf that allowing Martin to ride in a
cart would be unacceptable." The Court reviewed various rules of
golf—both modern and historic—and ultimately found that walking
was not an indispensable feature of golf." Specifically, the Court
noted that the historic rules of golf did not mention a walking re-
quirement, even after the advent of golf carts, and that the PGA's own
rules permitted competitors in the PGA Senior Tour to ride in carts
during PGA-sponsored competitions."
Second, the Court rejected the PGA's argument that because its
tournaments represented the highest level of competitive golf in
which most competitors were essentially of equal skill level, any advan-
tage that one player received would provide that player with a com-
petitive advantage." Rather, the Court responded that guaranteeing
equal conditions for all competitors would be impossible and that
walking the course produced such a low level of fatigue that it had
little impact on those conditions." Most importantly, the Court
stressed the specific facts related to Martin's situation." Because of his
disability, the Court reasoned, even with the cart, Martin endured
more fatigue as a result of his disorder than the able-bodied competi-
tors did walking 8'
 Therefore, permitting Martin to ride in a cart
would not provide him with a competitive advantage.82 Rather, the
Court held that that modification simply would remove the barrier to
his competing in the PGA that his disability had created, precisely the
outcome that the ADA envisioned." Having found, therefore, that
73 Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-83. This Note refers to these two alternative ways of finding
a fundamental alteration as a single two-prong test, the "two-pronged fundamental altera-
tion test." See id.
74 Id. at 683.
73
 Id. at 683,089.
78 Id. at 683-86,689.
77 Id. at 683-86.
78 See Martin, 532 U.S. at 686-88.
78 Id. at 687.
"") See id. at 688-90.
81 Id. at 690.
82 See id.
83 Marlin, 532 U.S. at 688-90.
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Martin's use of a golf cart would not fundamentally alter the game of
golf, the Supreme Court concluded that the ADA required the PGA
to allow Martin to use a golf cart in its competitions."
II. THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLIMC ASSOCIATION,
ITS ACADEMIC REQUIREMENTS, AND LITIGATION
ARISING FROM THE REQUIREMENTS
The NCAA is the most prominent sports governing body that
promulgates both athletic and academic requirements for student-
athletes. 85 It has been subject to much ADA litigation in the past, and
it likely will face additional Title III claims in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin. 8"
A. Background on the NCAA
The NCAA is a voluntary association composed of approximately
1200 colleges and universities divided among three divisions for the
purpose of administering intercollegiate athletics." The NCAA's main
duties include establishing and enforcing rules that govern intercol-
legiate athletics and overseeing programs aimed at serving its pur-
poses and goals. 88 The primary goal of the NCAA is to "maintain in-
tercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body." 89 To that end,
the NCAA strives to balance encouraging intercollegiate athletic
competition and ensuring that student-athletes receive high-quality
college eclucations. 9° Thus, the NCAA requires that student-athletes
114 Id. at 674, 691.
85 See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, PURPOSES AND GOALS, at littp://ncaa.org/
about/purposes.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
86 See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690-91 (2001); Cole v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1062-66 (N.D. Ga. 2000); Tatum v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 992 F. Stipp. 1114, 1116 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Matthews v. Nat'l Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n, 179 F. Supp. 20 1209, 1213 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
117 NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, WHAT Is THE NCAA?, at http://neaa.org/
about/whatjs_the_neaa.hunl (last visited Mar. 15, 2(1(15). This Note fetuses on the rules
for Division I members. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATtnEric ASS'N, WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN DIVISIONS I, II AND III?, at littp://www.ncaa.orgiabout/div_criterialtml (last
visited Mar. 15, 2005) (discussing the differences between the three divisions).
88 NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 85.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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both maintain amateur status and remain in good academic standing
at the member schools in which they are enrolled 9 1
The NCAA additionally requires that incoming student-athletes
meet specific academic requirements to be eligible to participate in
NCAA-sponsored sports. 42 Originally, the NCAA prohibited its mem-
ber institutions from providing athletic scholarships to those student-
athletes that the schools predicted—based on high school grade point
average (the "CPA") or standardized test scores—would not achieve a
minimum 1.6 CPA during their freshman years in college 99 After sev-
eral highly publicized cases of member-institution abuse of that stan-
dard, however, the NCAA implemented Proposition 48. 94 Proposition
48 stiffened the eligibility requirements to include a minimum high
school GPA in core courses in conjunction with minimum standard-
ized test scores.95 Although the NCAA subsequently has amended the
specific requirements, since implementing Proposition 48, the NCAA
has continued to employ initial eligibility requirements consisting of a
minimum high school GPA, a minimum number of core courses, and
a minimum standardized test score. 96
1. Initial Eligibility Requirements
The initial eligibility requirements aid the NCAA in determining
whether an incoming student-athlete will be able to succeed academi-
cally in college while handling the demands of participating in col-
lege athletics. 97 The NCAA Initial Eligibility Clearinghouse ("Clear-
inghouse"), with the approval of the Executive Committee, certifies
whether student-athletes have met their initial eligibility require-
ments. 98 The initial eligibility requirements include high school
91 NAT'L COLLEGIATE A•HL•IIC ASS'N, 2003-2004 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 125
(2003), available at hup://www.ncaa.org/library/rnembership/division_i_manual/2003-
04/2003-04_dl_manual.pdf. While participating in a member school's athletic program, a
student-athlete must be enrolled in a full-time program aimed at attaining a baccalaureate
degree and must be in good academic standing while taking at least twelve semester or
quarter hours of study to be eligible to compete in NCAA events. Id. at 130.
° Thomas A. Baker, III & Daniel 1'. Connaughton, Cureton v. NCAA: A Blow-by-Blow Ac-
count of the Landmark Title VI Challenges to the NCAA and Their 1?ecent Implications, 13 J. LEGAL.
ASPECTS SPORT 145,147-48 (2003).
93 Id. at 148.
94 Id.
99 Id.
911 NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, SUpra note 91, at 127; Baker & Connaughton,
supra note 92, at 148-50.
97 Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 974 F. Supp. 459,466-67 (D.Nj. 1997).
se
	
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 91, at 138.
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graduation, a minimum CPA in thirteen core courses, and a mini-
mum standardized test score on either the American College Testing
Assessment (the "ACT") or the Scholastic Aptitude Test (the "SAT" ).`19
The core courses cover various subjects and must he taught at or
above a school's regular academic level.m Remedial and special edu-
cation classes thus do not qualify as core courses, though the NCAA
may exempt student-athletes with learning disabilities from this re-
quirement. 191 The Initial Eligibility Index, a sliding scale that pairs
standardized test scores with CPAs, establishes the minimum CPA and
test scores. 192 The higher the GPA in core courses, the lower the
minimum standardized test requirement and vice versa.' 93
Depending on an incoming student-athlete's level of completion
of the initial eligibility requirements, the NCAA grants the following
three statuses: qualifier, partial-qualifier, and non-qualifier.'" The
highest status of eligibility is that of qualifier.' 05 Student-athletes who
meet the requirements of qualifier status are eligible for athletic-
based financial aid and may practice and compete during their first
year in college. 106 A partial-qualifier may receive athletic-based
financial aid and may practice with the college team, but may not par-
ticipate in NCAA competitions during their first year. 197 Non-qualifiers
are not eligible to receive athletic financial aid and may not practice
or compete during their first year. 199 Furthermore, neither non-
qualifiers nor partial-qualifiers may participate in more than three
seasons of any sport, unless by the beginning of their fifth year
(fourth season), they have received baccalaureate degrees, or for stu-
" Id. at 138-39. The current initial eligibility requirements apply to student-athletes
who will first enter college on or before August 1, 2005. Id. at 138. The NCAA also has
published its revised initial eligibility criteria that will apply to student athletes entering
college after that date. Id. at 139-44. The NCAA provides details on what qualify as core
courses, including specific subject areas and academic standards for the school and the
specific course. Id. at 144.
1 m Id. at 144.
Id.
102 Id. at 139-44.
105 NAT'L, Cou.KGIATE krtn.wric ASS'N, Supra note 91, at 139-44. For example, for stu-
dents with a CPA of 2.5 and above, the minimum SAT score is 820, but for students with a
minimum GPA of 2.0, the minimum SAT score is 1010. Id.
1 (}4 Id. at 142-48.
105 See id. at 138-48.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 147-48.
toe
	 COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN, supra note 91, at 148.
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dent-athletes with learning disabilities, they have completed eighty
percent of the work required for their designated degree programs.m
2. Modifications of the Initial Eligibility Requirements for Student-
Athletes with Disabilities
Although all student-athletes must meet the same initial eligibility
requirements, the NCAA may provide some accommodations to stu-
dent-athletes with learning disabilities."° To be eligible for such ac-
commodations, student-athletes must present some proof of the dis-
ability."' Students who have done so may then use courses for
students with disabilities that the Clearinghouse has designated as
core courses, use approved core courses that the student-athlete has
completed before enrolling in college (including courses the student
takes the summer after high school graduation), and use SAT and
ACT test scores earned during a nonstandard administration to satisfy
the initial eligibility requiretnents. 12
The NCAA's Academics/Eligibility/Compliance Cabinet deter-
mines whether the courses a student-athlete with a learning disability
takes qualify as core courses on the basis of confirmation forms issued
to the student-athlete's high school. 11 s Specifically, courses that ap-
pear to be taught below the regular academic level may count as core
courses for students with disabilities if the student-athlete's high
school principal submits a letter stating that the courses in question
are substantially similar to Clearinghouse-approved core courses, both
"qualitatively and quantitatively."'"
If, despite those accommodations, the student-athlete does not
meet qualifier status, the NCAA may grant an initial eligibility re-
quirement waiver." 5 The NCAA Subcommittee on Initial Eligibility
Waivers considers waiver requests and may grant a waiver based on a
student-athlete's overall academic record." 6 To make that determina-
tion, the NCAA may consider such factors as the extent to which the
109 Id.
110
 NAT A L COLLEGIATE ATI ILETIC ASSN, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON STUDENTS
WITH DISABILITIES, at Intp://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/membership_svcs/eligibility-
recruiting/faqs/disabilities (last updated Feb. 25, 2004).
1 " Id.
112
 Id.
113 NAT A L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN, supra note 91, at 145.
114 hi.
113 See id. at 147.
116 id.
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student's disability contributed to the failure to meet the eligibility
requirements, the student's individualized education plan, the stu-
dent's overall academic record' and standardized test performance,
accommodations for the disability that were available and used by the
student, and any other factor to help assess the student's prepared-
ness to succeed in college." 7 Based on that review, the Subcommittee
may provide an initial eligibility requirement waiver granting the stu-
dent-athlete partial-qualifier or qualifier status. 118
3. Consent Decree Involving the Initial Eligibility Requirements and
the Foundation of the NCAA's Policy Modifications for Student-
Athletes with Learning Disabilities
The NCAA's initial eligibility requirement modifications for stu-
dent-athletes with learning disabilities stem in part from a consent de-
cree with the U.S. Department of Justice (the "DOJ" ). 119 In response to
several individuals' complaints that the NCAA's initial eligibility re-
quirements violated Title III, the DOJ investigated the allegations.'"
The NCAA engaged in good faith negotiations with the DOJ to remedy
the alleged violations, and in May 1998, without admitting any ADA
violations or agreeing that it was subject to Title Ill, the NCAA entered
into a consent decree with the DOI. 121 Although the consent decree
self-terminated in May 2003, the NCAA's current policies regarding
initial eligibility requirement modifications for student-athletes with
learning disabilities continue to reflect the decree's terms. 122
During the negotiation process with the DOJ, the NCAA revised
some of its policies for student-athletes with learning disabilities.'"
Specifically, the NCAA agreed t9 accept course work completed after
high school graduation—but before college enrollment—to count
towards core course credit, and it revised its policy to allow students to
initiate the waiver request process themselves. 124
117 NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 110.
118 See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, .supra note 91, at 147.
Ill See Consent Decree, United States v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (D.D.C. May
1998), http://www.ttscloj.gov/crt/ada/neaa.htrn#anchor369197 (last revised Feb. 7, 2001).
The consent decree expired on May 1, 2003. Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
1" Id.; see, e.g., NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 91, at 145.
121 Consent Decree, supra note 119.
124 Id. Previously, member institutions had to initiate the waiver 	 on behalf of
the student-athlete. Id.
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The consent decree also required the NCAA to implement addi-
tional changes.' 25 First, the NCAA agreed to propose to its committees
changes to its bylaws so that a designation of "special education" or
"remedial" in a course title would not automatically disqualify that
course from being a core course. 126 Second, the NCAA agreed to pro-
pose to its committees that student-athletes with learning disabilities,
who are unable to meet the initial eligibility requirements, be able to
earn an additional year of athletic eligibility under certain condi-
tions. 127
 Third, the NCAA agreed that its committees responsible for
hearing initial eligibility requirement waiver requests for Divisions I
and II would be composed of experts in the field of learning disabili-
ties.'" Fourth, the NCAA agreed to employ an ADA liaison, to publish
its revised standards, and to report its progress to ensure continued
compliance with the ADA. 129
B. Pre-Martin Title III Cases Involving the NCAA's Initial
Eligibility Requirements
In addition to the complaints that led to the consent decree, sev-
eral student-athletes who did not attain qualifier status sued the
NCAA under Title III of the ADA. 13° The plaintiffs alleged that the
initial eligibility requirements discriminated against student-athletes
with learning disabilities because of their disabilities, and thus they
requested injunctions allowing them to participate in intercollegiate
athletics.' 51 Although the courts in those cases disagreed somewhat on
whether and to what extent an initial eligibility requirement waiver
would fundamentally alter the nature of the NCAA's privileges and
services, they generally agreed that Title III applied to the NCAA and
that some modifications to the NCAA would constitute fundamental
alterations of its program.'"
123
 Id.
125
127 Id.
128 Consent Decree, supra note 119.
12`3
13° See, e.g., Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1116; Ganden v. Nat'l Col-
legiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *1, *5 (N.D. III. Nov. 21, 1996)
(unpublished opinion).
"I See, e.g., Cole, 120 F. Stipp. 2d at 1067; Canden, 1996 WI, 680000, at *I, 5.
132 See, e.g., Tatum, 992 F. Stipp. at 1121; Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *10; see also Susan
M. Denbo, Disability Lessons in Higher Education: Accommodating Learning-Disabled Students
and Student-Athletes Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 41 Am.
Bus, L.J. 145, 189-99 (2003) (discussing cases in which courts deferred to the NCAA).
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First, the courts that reached the question whether Title III ap-
plied to the NCAA suggested that it could.'" The courts reasoned that
the NCAA operated a place of public accommodation, and thus was
subject to Title III because it maintained significant control over its
member institutions' athletic facilities. 134 Specifically, the courts rea-
soned that the NCAA controlled the facilities not only because the
NCAA leased them for tournaments, but also because it regulated the
way in which student-athletes could train, controlled ticket and con-
cessions prices and broadcasting rights, and governed which teams
could play in each facility)"
Second, most of the courts concluded—or at least assumed with-
out deciding—that the ADA does not and should not require the
NCAA to abandon its initial eligibility requirements.'" Rather, the
courts granted the NCAA some deference, suggesting that the initial
eligibility requirements assisted the NCAA in achieving its goal of fos-
tering strident athletics. 137 For example, in 2000, in Cole v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia stated that Title III "does not require an institution to
`lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to accom-
modate a handicapped person." 38 Furthermore, the court found
that because the initial eligibility requirements were necessary to the
133 See, e.g., Tatum, 992 F. Supp, at 1121; Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *10-1 I .
134 See, e.g., Tatum, 992 F. Stipp. at 1121; Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *10-11,
135 See, e.g., Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1121; Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *I 0-11,
1361 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (assuming without deciding that Title III did not re-
quire the NCAA to abandon its initial eligibility requirements); Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at
4(16-67 (holding that abandonment of the initial eligibility requirements would constitute
a fundamental alteration and that waiver process itself constituted a reasonable
modification); Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *16 (holding that requested waiver would fun-
damentally alter the nature of the NCAA's programs and services). Other courts did not
reach the question of whether the requested modification would constitute a fundamental
alteration, but they nonetheless indicated that the modification would have been reason-
able. Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1123 11.5 (stating in a footnote that requiring the NCAA to
accept maimed standardized test scores would not fundamentally alter the nature or its
programs, though not reaching the question directly because the plaintiff was 'Mind not to
be disabled); Butler v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. C96-165611, 1996 WL 1058233, at
*6 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 1996) (unpublished opinion) (not reaching the question of
whether the requested modification would constitute a fundamental alteration, but in
conducting preliminary injunction analySis, finding that granting a waiver for the plaintiff
would not harm the NCAA).
1 " See Cole, 120 F. Stipp. 2c1 at 1070; Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 466-67; Ganden, 1996 WL
680000, at * 16.
138 120 F. Stipp. 2d at 1070 (quoting Pottgen v. Mo. State High Srh. Activities Ass'n, 40
F.3(1 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Southeastern Ginty. Coll. v. 4. mk, 442 U.S. 397,
398-99 (1979)) (internal quotations omitted)).
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accomplishment of the NCAA's interest of ensuring that student-
athletes were prepared to succeed in their academics and did not
simply attend college to play sports, granting a waiver to the plaintiff
who did not meet the requirements would not constitute a reasonable
accommodation under Title III. 139 The court also suggested that def-
erence to the NCAA Waiver Subcommittee's decisions would be ap-
propriate and stated that the ADA did not require the NCAA to aban-
don its academic requirements for any athlete because doing so
would not be a reasonable accommodation."°
Similarly, in 1996, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois in Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, found that
the plaintiff's requested modification of the initial eligibility require-
ments would constitute a fundamental alteration."' The court began
the fundamental alteration analysis by noting that the eligibility re-
quirements served an important interest for the NCAA, namely ensur-
ing that student-athletes were prepared for the academic aspects of
college. 142 For student-athletes with learning disabilities, the initial
eligibility requirements not only served that purpose, but they also
ensured through the waiver process that the NCAA provided those
student-athletes with individualized consideration, as Title III re-
quires. 143 The court reasoned that removing the core course require-
ment for the plaintiff would fundamentally alter the nature of the
NCAA requirements by requiring the NCAA to accept courses with
little substantive similarity to accepted core classes and by denying the
NCAA a mode of determining the student-athlete's academic poten-
tial.'" Similarly, lowering the minimum GPA for the plaintiff would
fundamentally alter the NCAA's requirements by removing "the
NCAA's primary objective tool to determine a student's academic ca-
pabilities." That, the court held, was not the result that Title III en-
visionecl. 146 Rather, the court noted that although a situation may exist
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1071-72. Indeed, the court noted that laJbandoning the eligibility require-
ments altogether liar this or any athlete is unreasonable as a matter of law and is not re-
quired by the ADA." Id. at 1071.
141 See 1996 WL 680000, at *15.
142 Id.
149
144 id.
145 Id. at *I 6.
we Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *16.
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that would warrant the NCAA's lowering of its GPA requirement, such
a modification generally would be tmreasonable." 7
Additionally, in 1997, in Bothers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denied a student-
athlete with a learning disability a preliminary injunction requiring the
NCAA to grant him qualifier status because he failed to demonstrate a
likelihood of establishing that the NCAA's initial eligibility require-
ments discriminated against him in violation of the ADA by screening
out student-athletes with learning dis2tbilities. 148 The court first noted
that the NCAA provided accommodations for student-athletes with
learning disabilities through the waiver process and by allowing high
school principals to demonstrate that special education courses quali-
tatively and quantitatively provided students with the same knowledge
as accepted core courses. 149 The court then suggested that the plaintiff
was attempting to remove the core course requirement instead of sim-
ply seeking a modification)" That result would be unreasonable un-
der the ADA, the court reasoned, because the ADA required only that
the NCAA modify its requirements, not abandon them altogether)"
Furthermore, the court added that the initial eligibility requirements
were necessary to accomplish the NCAA's goals of maintaining inter-
collegiate athletics as an integral part of the collegiate program and
ensuring that student-athletes progressed academically) 52 The court
also noted that the core course requirements allowed the NCAA to
evaluate whether student-athletes would be able to handle the de-
mands of both college academics and athletics) 53 Following that rea-
soning, the court held that a complete abandonment of the core
course requirement would fundamentally alter the nature of the
NCAA's program and that the NCAA's waiver process constituted a
reasonable modification for student-athletes with learning disabilities
in satisfaction of the ADA's requirements) 54
147 Id. The court added, however, that not every waiver of the initial eligibility re-
quirements would fundamentally alter the NCAA's purpose, and thus the NCAA was not
completely insulated from claims that it violated Title III. See id. at *15.
tits 974 F. Supp. at 467.
149 Id,
150 Id. at 466.
151 Id,
152 Id. at 466-67.
153 Bowers, 974 F. Stipp. at 466-67.
154 Id. at 467.
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III. APPLICATION OF THE MARTIN STANDARD:
Two DIFFERING APPROACHES
Although the courts that decided Title III cases involving the
NCAA's initial eligibility requirements had begun to develop a pattern
for analyzing those claims, it is unclear how courts will decide similar
cases in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2001 decision in PGA Tour;
Inc. v. Martin.' 55
 The confusion stems from the fact that the Supreme
Court recited two versions of the correct analysis of Title III claims in
the Martin decision. 156 In its analysis in Martin, the Supreme Court
examined whether the requested modification was reasonable and
necessary, and yet would not fundamentally alter the nature of the
PGA's services.' 57 The Court then announced the two-pronged fun-
damental alteration test, which asks whether the modification would
alter the nature of the competition to the extent that it would be un-
acceptable even if provided to all competitors, or whether the
modification would provide one competitor with an unfair advan-
tage.'"
Later in the Martin opinion, however, the Supreme Court restated
the analysis for Title III claims. 159 The second version of the analysis
requires courts to ask only whether the requested modification is rea-
sonable and necessary and would not constitute a fundamental altera-
tion, but it does not require the two-pronged fundamental alteration
test. 160
 It is thus unclear whether the Court intended the two-pronged
fundamental alteration test to be a required part of Title III analysis in
future claims. 161
 Furthermore, in applying Martin to subsequent Title
III claims, some courts have followed the two-pronged fundamental
alteration test, but others have not. 162
155 See PGA Tour, inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 682-83, 688 (2001); Cole v. Nat'l Colle-
giate Athletic Ass'n, 120 F. Stipp. 2d 1060, 1071-72 (N.D. Ga. 2000); Gamlen v. Nat'l Col-
legiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *14-16 (N.D. III. Nov. 21, 1996)
(unpublished opinion).
156 See 532 U.S. at 682-83, 688.
157 Id. at 682.
158 Id. at 682-83.
159 Id. at 688.
160 See id.
Ril See Martin, 532 U.S. at 682, 688.
162 Compare Doe v. Haverford Sch., No. Civ.A. 03-3989, 2003 WL 22097782, at *5, *8
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2003) (unpublished opinion) (not following two-pronged fundamental
alteration test), with Matthews v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 179 F. Stipp. 2d 1209,
1225-27 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (applying the two-pronged fundamental alteration test).
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A. Matthews v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n: One Court's Attempt
at Applying Martin to the NCAA
In 2001, in Matthews v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington followed the
standards the U.S. Supreme Court set out in Martin, including the
two-pronged fundamental alteration test. 165 In Matthews, the court
granted, in part, the request of a student-athlete with a learning dis-
ability for summary judgment involving a waiver to one of the NCAA's
academic requirements.'" One of the NCAA's continuing eligibility
requirements, the 75/25 rule, required all NCAA student-athletes to
complete seventy-five percent of their annual required credit hours
during the regular academic year. 165 Per the NCAA bylaws, however,
student-athletes with learning disabilities could request waivers to that
rule.' 66 Although the NCAA previously had granted the plaintiff waiv-
ers to the 75/25 rule, the NCAA declined to grant an additional
waiver. 167 Rather, the NCAA declared him academically ineligible,
claiming that the student-athlete required the waiver not because of
his learning disability, but because of his lack of effort. 168
To analyze the plaintiff's claim, the court first decided that the
NCAA was subject to Title III of the ADA.' 69 Discussing several courts'
Title III analyses, the court in Matthews held that Title III applied to
the NCAA based on the NCAA's large degree of control over students'
access to the arena of college athletics."° Furthermore, the court indi-
cated that the ADA generally protected the plaintiff in Matthews be-
cause he was disabled under the statute's definition and because the
NCAA's disqualification of him was a result of his disability."'
163 Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1225-27 (citing Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-83).
164 Id. at 1231. The court dismissed the claim with prejudice as moot because the
plaintiff was completing his fourth and final year of eligibility during the pendency of the
case. Id, at 12 i 3,1228.
165 Id. at 1215. Put differently, the 75/25 rule prohibits student-athletes from complet-
ing more than twenty-five percent of their required annual credit hours during summer
semesters. Id. The NCAA implemented the 75/25 rule in 1992 after some member institu-
tions expressed concern that some student-athletes were taking reduced course loads dur-
ing the school year and excessively using summer school courses to maintain their aca-
demic eligibility. Id.
1641
167 Id. at 1216.
168 Matthews, 179 F. Stipp. 2d at 1216.
169 Id. at 1223.
170 Id. at 1219-22 (discussing Martin, Cole, Tatum, Bowers, and Ganden); see supra notes
133-135 and accompanying text.
171 Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1224,
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Having found Tide III of the ADA applicable, the Matthews court
next conducted a Title III analysis)" The court first required the
plaintiff to show the existence of a reasonable modification of a rule
that would enable the plaintiff to participate in the specified activ-
ity.'" After the plaintiff met that burden, the court continued, the
defendant must then show that the requested modification would
fundamentally alter the nature of its program or activity.' 74
 The court
next cited Martin for the proposition that in evaluating what would
constitute a reasonable modification, courts should focus on the indi-
vidual circumstances of the case instead of simply determining
whether a blanket waiver of the requirement would constitute a fun-
damental alteration)" Specifically, the Matthews court noted that Mar-
tin stated that a rule peripheral to the nature of a service or activity
could be waived in certain instances without fundamentally altering
the nature of that service or activity)" Finally, the court cited Martin's
two-pronged fundamental alteration test—that a modification of cer-
tain rules may constitute a fundamental alteration if it would affect an
essential aspect of the program such that it would be unacceptable
even if applied to all participants or if the modification would provide
an unfair advantage to one participant) 77
Applying that standard, the court held that a waiver of the 75/25
rule for the plaintiff would not constitute a fundamental alteration of
the NCAA's programs.'" First, the court noted that the NCAA previ-
ously had granted the plaintiff two academic waivers, including a
waiver of the 75/25 rule)" The court highlighted the difference be-
tween Matthews and cases involving the initial eligibility requirements
in which the NCAA had never granted waivers)" Second, the court
added that the NCAA adopted the 75/25 rule long after it had estab-
lished its purpose and had begun regulating college athletics) 81
Third, because the plaintiff had exceeded some of the NCAA's other
academic requirements, the court held that a waiver of the 75/25 rule
172
 ht. at 1224-27.
173
 Id. at 1225.
174 Id.
175 Id. (citing Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-83).
178 Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1225 (citing Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-83).
177 Id. (citing Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-83).
178 Id. at 1226.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181
 Matthews, 179 F. Stipp. 2d at 1226.
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would not have frustrated the NGAA's purpose of fostering academic
achievement for student-athletes. 182
The court used those findings in applying the Martin. two-pronged
fundamental alteration test.'" As for the first prong, the court held that
although completely abandoning the NCAA's academic requirements
would compromise the NCAA's purpose, a waiver of the 75/25 rule,
even if provided to all athletes, would not alter an essential aspect of
the NCAA's purpose.'" The court based its decision on the facts that
the NCAA had numerous other bylaws to ensure student-athletes' aca-
demic achievement and that neither football (the plaintiff's sport) nor
college courses of study require students to complete seventy-five per-
cent of their coursework during the regular school year. 185 Addressing
the second prong, the court held that providing the plaintiff with a
waiver would not result in him gaining any unfair advantage, but rather
would simply permit him to participate in intercollegiate athletics. 186
Therefore, applying the individualized inquiry standard from Martin,
the Matthews court found that granting the plaintiff a waiver to the
75/25 rule would not fundamentally alter the NCAA's purpose.'"
B. Doe v. Haverford School: A Differing Approach to Applying Martin
Although the Matthews court followed the two-pronged funda-
mental alteration test, another court followed the U.S. Supreme
Court's alternate annunciation of the Martin standard, and thus did
not follow the two-pronged test.'" In 2003, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Doe v. Haverford School, inter-
preted the Supreme Court's Title [II standard from Martin in an ADA
case involving a private school.'" In Doe, a high school student with a
learning disability at The Haverford School filed for a preliminary
injunction requiring Haverford to modify its academic requirements
pursuant to the ADA)" Despite repeated waivers of Haverford's aca-
152 Id.
I" Id. at 1226-27 (citing Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-83).
DM
185
150 Matthews, 179 F. Stipp. 2d at 1227.
187 Id. at 1226-27 (citing Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-83).
"8 Compare Doe, 2003 WL 22007782, *5, *8 (not Following the two-pronged fundamen-
tal alteration test), with Matthews, 179 F. Stipp. 2d at 1225-27 (applying the two-pronged
Fundamental alteration test).
"9 Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, at *5-9 (citing Martin, 532 U.S. at 688).
190 Id. at *1. Title III, and not Title 11, applies to this case because 11	 .1 is a pri-
vate school. See id.
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demic requirements, the plaintiff, who suffered from sleep disorders,
failed to complete the required coursework to advance to the twelfth
grade and thus requested additional modifications.'"
To evaluate the Title III claim, the court interpreted the Martin
standard to require an individualized inquiry into the circumstances of
the case and noted that three requirements must be met before a
court should obligate an entity to provide the requested
modification. 192
 First, the modification must be reasonable.'" Second,
it must be necessary for the individual with a disability.'" Third, the
requested modification must not fundamentally alter the nature of the
entity's services. 195 The school did not challenge the necessity of the
requested modifications; therefore, the only questions before the
court were whether the modifications were reasonable and whether
they would not fundamentally alter the nature of the school's ser-
vices. 196
Regarding reasonableness, the court found that the plaintiff did
not demonstrate likely success on the merits. 197
 The court noted that
courts generally deferred to the decisions of academic institutions
because those institutions were in the best position to evaluate a re-
quest in light of their academic standards. 198 Therefore, the court
added, as long as a school rationally reached a justifiable conclusion
that the modifications would not be reasonable, courts generally
should defer to that decision.'" In Doe, the court noted that Haver-
ford already had accommodated the plaintiff with a series of
modifications and that any rejections of additional modifications rea-
sonably could be justified to preserve the school's academic stan-
dards.200
Although the court found the requested modifications unreason-
able, even if the plaintiff could meet his burden of proving reason-
ableness, the court added that the requested modifications would
191 Id. at *1-3. The requested modifications included extra time to complete past-due
coursework, a requirement that his teachers be available to him during the summer to
answer any questions about Iris unfinished work, and a transcript that would not contain
any failing grades for one school year. Id. at *5-6.
192 Id. at *5-6 (citing Martin, 532 U.S. at 688).
193 Id. at *5.
194 Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, at *5.
195 Id.
196 id.
197
 Id. at *5-8.
199 M. at *8.
199 Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, at *6.
No Id, at *7.
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fundamentally alter the nature of Haverford's services, and thus
would not be required by Title III. 201 Again, the court deferred to the
judgment of the school, noting that schools must consider the feasi-
bility, cost, and possibility of alternative means of accommodating the
student in reaching their decisions. 202 Using that. standard, the court
validated Haverford's determination that the requested modifications
would fundamentally alter its academic programs. 2D8
Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the
modifications would not fundamentally alter the nature of Haverfbrcl's
services because the school previously had provided similar
modifications. 204 The court rejected the argument not only because of
a change in the plaintiff's circumstances (namely, that he had an in-
creased amount of outstanding work), but also because the statute did
not convert prior modifications into required reasonable modifications
in the future. 208 That reasoning, the court explained, would provide a
disincentive for entities covered by Title III to accommodate individuals
with disabilities—even in situations not required by the ADA—for fear
of having to continue such modifications indefinitely. 208 As a result, the
court concluded, the ADA's purpose of integrating individuals with dis-
abilities into society would be hindered. 207
IV. COURTS' TRADITIONAL DEFERENCE TO THE JUDGMENT OF
ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
in 2003 in Doe v. Haverford School, was not the first court to defer to the
professional judgment of an academic institution regarding the rea-
sonableness of a requested modification. 208 Rather, numerous other
201 Id. at *8.
202 Id.
203 Id. at *8-9.
204 Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, at *8-9.
205 Id,
206 See id.
207 see id.
208 Doe v. flaverford Sch., No. Civ.A. 03-3989,2003 WL 22097782, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
5, 2003) (unpublished opinion); see, e.g., Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3(1 1041,
1047-48 (9th Cir. 1999); cf. D'Amico v. N.Y. State M. of Law Exarn'rs, 813 F. Stipp. 217,
222 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (declining to defer to Board's position regarding what constituted an
appropriate accommodation for the plaintiff's visual disability).
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courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have held that such defer-
ence is warranted 209
For example, in 1979, in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the need to balance the rights of
an individual with a disability with the rights of academic institutions
to maintain their academic integrity. 210 In that case, the defendant
school denied the plaintiff, who suffered from a hearing disability,
admission into a nursing program because of her disability. 211 The
U.S. Supreme Court found that the defendant's refusal to modify its
nursing program for the plaintiff was not unlawfully discriminatory. 212
Rather, the Court accepted the college's statements that its purpose
was to train nursing professionals and that the plaintiff could not par-
ticipate in the school's program without lowering its standards.213 De-
ferring to the school, the Court thus held that there is "no require-
ment upon an educational institution to lower or to effect substantial
modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person. "214
Similarly, in 1999, in Zukle v. Regents of the University of California,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a medical
school's decision to dismiss a student with a disability who had not
met several requirements. 215 Noting that academic institutions de-
serve courts' deference, the Zukle court pointed to precedent that
noted that courts have a limited ability to evaluate academic Stan-
dards. 216 In particular, contrasted to the experience of education ex-
perts, courts are ill-equipped to evaluate whether a student potentially
could meet the standards of a particular school, and the Zukle court,
therefore, adopted a standard for reviewing cases questioning the de-
cisions of academic institutions. 2" The standard recognizes that the
courts are final arbiters of those decisions but notes that courts should
grant judicial deference to schools so long as schools' academic deci-
20 See, e.g., Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,412-14 (1979); Zukle, 166
F.3d at 1047-48; Bercovitch v. Baldwin, 133 F.3d 141,152-53 (1st Cir. 1998).
910 442 U.S. at 412-14. Davis involved a claim arising from § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. Id. at 400; see 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000 & West Stipp. 2002). Analysis of rights and obliga-
tions created by the ADA, however, are almost identical to those set forth in the Rehabilita-
tion Act. Zukle, 166 F.3d at 1045 n.l 1.
211
 Davis, 442 U.S. at 400-02.
212 Id. at 41 3.
215 Id.
214 Id.
235 166 F.3c1 at. 1043-46,1047-48. Zukle involved a Title II ADA claim because the de-
fendant was a government agency. Id. at 1045.
216 Id. at 1047.
212 Id. at 1047-48.
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sions arc sound and not solely implemented for the purpose of deny-
ing an education to individuals with disabilitics. 218 The court further
held that such deference is equally warranted to an academic institu-
tion's determination that a reasonable accommodation would not be
available.219
Additionally, in 1998, the US, Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit indicated that deference to the professional judgment of an aca-
demic institution that attempted to suspend a student with serious
behavioral problems was warranted in Bercovitch v. Baldwin School,
inc. 22° In that case, which involved a Title III claim filed against a pri-
vate school, the court held that the district court had erred in not fol-
lowing the professional judgment of the academic institution as to the
reasonableness of the requested modifications. 22 ' The Bercovitch court
noted that the record did not indicate any evidence of intentional
discrimination or stereotyping on the part of the school. 222 Thus, the
court deferred to the school's decision that the requested
modifications involving exemptions to the school's disciplinary code
were unreasonable because they would fundamentally alter the nature
of its programs. 225 The court further urged future courts examining
similar cases to exercise caution in substituting the judgment of the
court for that of a school. 224
V. ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF PGA TOUR, INC. V. MARTIN TO
FUTURE LITIGATION INVOLVING THE NCAA's INITIAL
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
The cases involving Title III of the ADA and the NCAA's initial eli-
gibility requirements decided before the U.S. Supreme Court's 2001
decision in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin and the cases applying varied inter-
pretations of the Martin standard indicate that courts should be careful
in applying the Martin standard to the NCAA's initial eligibility re-
quirements.225 Because a stringent interpretation of Martin may not be
218 ,rd.
219 Id. at 1048.
22° See 133 F.3d at 153.
221 Id. (citing Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.3d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1992)).
222 Id.
225 See id. at '152-54.
224 See id. at 153.
225 See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 682-83, 688 (2001); see, e.g., Doe v.
HaverfOrd Sch., No. Civ.A. 03-3989, 2003 WI, 22097782, at *4-9 (E.D l' - i. Aug. 5, 2003)
(unpublished opinion); Matthews v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 2d 1209,
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required and because such an interpretation would drastically hinder
the NCAA's ability to achieve its purpose of integrating college athletics
and academics, courts should provide the NCAA the same level of def-
erence in evaluating Title III requests for modifications to the NCAA's
initial eligibility requirements that they provide to schools.226
A. Applying Title III of the ADA to the NCAA
The threshold question in determining the extent to which the
Martin decision will impact the NCAA's initial eligibility requirements
is whether Title III applies to the NCAA. 227 Based on prior litigation
involving ADA claims against the NCAA, the Martin decision, and the
overall purpose of the ADA, the answer appears clear that the NCAA
is subject to Title III because the NCAA maintains control over places
of public accommodation—athletic facilities 228 Assuming Title III
does apply to the NCAA, the more poignant question is how to apply
the Martin standard to questions involving the NCAA's initial eligibil-
ity requirements. 22°
B. Differentiating Matthews from Future Initial Eligibility Requirement Cases
In 2001, in Matthews v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, the only
case involving an ADA claim against the NCAA's academic require-
ments decided since the U.S. Supreme Court released the Martin de-
cision, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
did not distinguish between athletic and academic rules, but rather
directly applied the Martin standard, including the two-pronged fun-
damental alteration test. 23° Using that standard, the court held that a
1218-23 (F.D. Wa. 2001); Cole v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060,
1071-72 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
226 See Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-83, 688; Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, at *4-9; Matthews, 179
F. Supp. 2d at 1218-23; Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1071-72.
227 See 532 U.S. at 675-76.
228 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000) (including private entities in its liberal
definition of public accommodation for the purposes of Title 111); Martin, 532 U.S. at
675-80 (holding that Title III applied to the PGA because it operated places of public
accommodation); Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1219-23 (holding that Title 111 applies to
the NCAA because the NCAA exercises control over the facilities); Tatum v. Nat'l Colle-
giate Athletic Ass'n, 992 F. Stipp. 1114,1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that Title III applies
to the NCAA because the NCAA maintains control over the facilities).
229
 See Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-83,688. Compare Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, *5, *8 (not fol-
lowing the two-pronged fundamental alteration lest), with Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at
1225-27 (applying the two-pronged fundamental alteration test).
250 See Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1224-27 (citing Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-83).
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waiver to a continuing academic eligibility requirement for a qualified
student-athlete with a disability would not constitute a fundamental
alteration of the NCAA's purpose and policies 2 31
Although the Matthews court applied the Martin standard as the
Supreme Court had articulated it, the Martin standard should not ap-
ply as directly to other NCAA academic rules, namely, its initial eligi-
bility requirements, because the application of the two-pronged fun-
damental alteration test in the academic setting hinders the NCAA's
ability to control its academic goals. 232 For example, assume a
qualified student-athlete with a disability brings suit against the NCAA
for failure to grant a waiver of its initial eligibility requirements and
that the NCAA does not dispute that a waiver would be a reasonable
and necessary Modification for that student-athlete. 233 Following the
Martin two-pronged standard,, once the NCAA asserts that the
modification would fundamentally alter its nature, the court next
would need to analyze whether such a modification would alter an
aspect of the NCAA so fundamental that the modification would be
unacceptable even if provided to all student-athletes or would provide
the student-athlete with an unfair advantage:254
Regarding the first inquiry of whether a requested modification
would be unacceptable even if applied to all student-athletes, the
NCAA would always fail because the initial eligibility requirements
would be deemed periphera1. 235 Although the NCAA could differenti-
ate the initial eligibility requirements from the peripheral 75/25 rule
because they are the only way to evaluate incoming students (whereas
the 75/25 rule is one of many continuing academic standards), given
the Court's narrow reading of what is essential in Martin and the simi-
larities between the initial eligibility requirements and the 75/25 rule
that the Matthews court previously had found to be nonessential, that
argument most likely would fail for several reasons 236
First, the NCAA regularly has provided student-athletes with ini-
tial eligibility requirement waivers. 237 A waiver of initial eligibility re-
quirements would no more constitute a fundamental alteration to the
2" Id.
232 See Martin, 532 U.S. at 1182-83, 688; Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, al *4-9; Matthews, 179
F. Stipp. 2(1 at 1218-23; Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1071-72.
2" See, e.g., Cole, 120 F. Stipp. 2d at 1063-417.
2S4 See 532 U.S. at 682-83.
2'5 See infra notes 236-242 and accompanying text.
236 See Martin, 532 U.S. at 689; Matthews, 179 F. Stipp. 2d al 1226-27.
257 jenny Blayden & Cynthia Pemberton, An Investigation of NCAA Initial Eligibility Waiver
Applications and Awards fmm 1999 to 2001, 131 1. rizAL ASPECTS SPORT 39, I" 19 (2002).
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NCAA than a waiver of the walking rule for the PGA because, like the
rules of golf that do not always require walking, the NCAA does not
always require student-athletes to meet the initial eligibility require-
ments.258 Second, as the Matthews decision noted, the NCAA had de-
clared its mission to integrate academics and athletics long before it
implemented certain aspects of its academic requirements 239 Again,
in the same way that the official rules of golf did not specifically for-
bid the use of carts, the NCAA rules, at least at their inception, did
not require the initial academic eligibility requirements, which them-
selves have changed several times. 240 Finally, following the Matthews
approach, because none of the rules of NCAA-sponsored sports re-
quires any academic standards and because the NCAA member insti-
tutions may not necessarily require the same academic standards as
the NCAA for admission, a waiver of the initial eligibility requirements
would be no more offensive than a general waiver of the 75/25 re-
quirement, which the Matthews court found acceptable. 241 Therefore,
because the NCAA cannot differentiate its rules and waivers from
those of the PGA and because the Matthews court concluded that a
continuing eligibility requirement was not fundamental, the NCAA
likely cannot prevail on the first prong of the Martin fundamental al-
teration test. 242
Similarly, as for the second inquiry, assuming that the requested
core course or test score/GPA modifications were reasonable and
necessary, the modification would never provide the student-athlete
with an unfair advantage. 243 Rather, like the golf cart for Martin, an
initial eligibility requirement waiver would simply mitigate whatever
obstacles to meeting qualifier status the student-athlete's learning dis-
ability had caused. 2"
Therefore, the result of following the Matthews court's interpreta-'
tion of the Martin decision as requiring the two-pronged fundamental
alteration test for academic questions would be to deprive the NCAA
of its affirmative defense to claims of reasonableness. 245 Consequently,
the NCAA would need to succeed in showing that a modification
888 See Martin, 532 U.S. at 686-88; Blayden & Pemberton, supra note 237, at 48.
288 Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
248
 See Martin, 532 U.S. at 684-85; Baker & Connaughton, supra note 92, at 147-50.
241 See Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1226-27.
242 See Id.
242 See id.
2" See Martin, 532 U.S. at 690; Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.
245 See Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1226-27.
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would be either unreasonable (for a reason other than that the
modification would fundamentally alter its nature) or unnecessary for
that student. 246 Alternatively, the NCAA could simply honor every re-
quest for an initial eligibility requirement waiver from a student-
athlete with a learning disability, regardless of whether the requested
modification would be harmful to the NCAA's academic mission."' In
that way, following the Martin standard as stringently as the Matthews
court would essentially remove the initial eligibility requirements for
at least some students (namely those student-athletes with learning
disabilities for whom a waiver would be reasonable and necessary),
which is the precise outcome that several courts explicitly have de-
notinced. 248 Furthermore, such .a limitation on the NCAA's ability to
regulate incoming student-athletes would substantially impair its abil-
ity to achieve its goals of ensuring that student-athletes succeed aca-
demically, as well as athletically. 249
C. Following the Doe Approach Allows the NCAA to Protect Its Mission
Rather than differentiating its initial eligibility requirements
from its 75/25 rule, the NCAA should base future arguments on the
2003 U.S. District Court for the Eastern Division's decision, Doe v.
Haverford School. 25° In that case, the court interpreted the Marlin stan-
dard to require the following three inquiries: (1) whether the
modification is reasonable, (2) whether the modification is necessary
for the individual, and (3) whether the modification would funda-
mentally alter the nature of the services provided by the entity. 251 The
Doe court did not divide the requirement that the modification not
fundamentally alter the nature of the services into the two-pronged
fundamental alteration test that the Martin decision created. 252
This interpretation of the Martin decision's standard has merit. 255
Because the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconcile a cir-
248 See id.
242 See id.
248 See Id.; see also Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1071-72 (stating that Title Ell does not re-
quire the NCAA to abandon iLs initial eligibility requirements); Ganders v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WI, 680000, at *15, *16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996) (un-
published opinion).
248 See Cole, 120 F. Stipp. 2d at 1071-72; NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, supra note 85.
250 2003 WL 22097782, at *8-10.
251 Id. at *5.
252 See Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, at *5; see also Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-81 (discussing two-
pronged test).
255 See 532 U.S. at 682-83, 688.
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cult split involving the Title III claims of golfers with disabilities against
golf associations, it is arguable that the Court intended the two-
pronged fundamental alteration test to apply to only professional golf
or similar cornpetitions. 254 Specifically, in announcing the two-pronged
analysis, the Court used language specific to the PGA, although more
neutral language was available-1d n theory, a modification of peti-
tioner's golf tournaments might constitute a fundamental alteration in
two different ways."255 In contrast, later in the decision, the Court re-
stated its interpretation of Title III's requirement without any reference
to sports or the two-pronged fundamental alteration test:
To comply with this command [that places of public accom-
modations make reasonable accommodations for individuals
with disabilities], an individualized inquiry must be made to
determine whether a specific modification for a particular
person's disability would be reasonable under the circum-
stances as well as necessary for that person, and yet at the
same time not work a fundamental alteration. 256
Furthermore, the Court outlined the second version of the standard
in a portion of the opinion discussing Title III generally, but it men-
tioned the two-pronged fundamental alteration standard only in the
portion discussing Martin's claim against the PGA specifically. 257
In Doe, the court did not apply the two-pronged test when con-
sidering whether the requested modifications would constitute a fun-
damental alteration. 258 Rather, the Doe court cited pre-Martin cases
involving ADA claims brought against academic institutions. 259 Doe
thus illustrates that Martin did not necessarily override all previous
Title [II precedent, but rather simply confirmed the three-part in-
quiry that courts had followed in conducting Title III analyses. 26° At
the most basic level, therefore, the NCAA should argue in future Title
III actions involving its initial eligibility requirements that the stan-
254 See id. at 674.
255 Id. at 682. A more neutral way of introducing the standard would be to simply de-
lete the words "of petitioner's golf tournaments." See id.
256 Id. at 688.
257 Id. at 682-83,688.
258 2003 WL 22097782, at *5.
255 Id.
260 See id.; Cole, 120 F. Stipp. 2d at 1070-72; Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *I, * 12.
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dards used by the courts in the pre-Martin Title III cases involving the
initial eligibility requirements continue to be valid. 261
Furthermore, if courts were to follow the Doe interpretation of
the Martin standard in future cases involving the NCAA's initial eligi-
bility requirements, the result would be comparable to the outcomes
of pre-Martin initial eligibility cases, in which the NCAA succeeded
with a defense of fundamental alteration.262 Without having to adhere
to the narrow inquiry of the two-pronged fundamental alteration test,
courts would have more leeway in evaluating whether . the
modification would fundamentally alter the NCAA's academic pur-
pose, and thus courts could ask questions more tailored to that pur-
pose.263 Thus, courts could continue to provide some deference to the
NCAA so that it could continue to maintain its academic standards. 264
Even if courts follow the Doe interpretation of the Martin stan-
dard in future Title III claims involving the NCAA's initial eligibility
requirements, the NCAA is not guaranteed victory. 265 For example,
during a preliminary injunction analysis, one pre-Martin court deter-
mined that the NCAA would lose little by granting a waiver to a stu-
dent-athlete with a learning disability. 266 Furthermore, cases in which
the NCAA prevailed arose out of preliminary motions, and therefore
future litigation that concludes in a trial may not dictate the same re-
sult. 267 Therefore, in future litigation, the NCAA should request the
same level of deference that courts continually afford to schools and
other academic institutions, as recently outlined in Doe.268
261 See Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, at *4-9; Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1070-72; Ganden, 1996
WL 680000, at *1, *12.
262 See Doe, 2003 WI, 22097782, at *4-9; Cole, 120 F. Stipp. 2i1 at 1070-72; Gander, 1996
WL 680000, at *1, *12.
20 See Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, at *4-9; Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1070-72; Gamlen, 1996
WL 680000, at *1, *12.
264 See Doe, 2003 WI, 22097782, at *4-9; Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1070-72; Groubm, 1996
WL 6800(10, at *1, 8 12; NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATIILE:Tic ASSN, supra note 85.
266 See. Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, at *4-9; Butler v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No.
C96-1656D, 1996 WL 1058233, at *1, *6 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 1996) (unpublished opinion).
266 Butler, 1996 WL 1058233, at *6.
267 See, e.g., Cole, 120 F. Stipp. 2d at 1062, 1070-72; Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at * 1,
*14-16.
266 See 2003 WL 22097782, at *4-9. Ruling in favor of The liaverford School, the Doe
court held that courts should afford the saute level of deference to schools as to what con-
stitutes a fundamental alteration as they would in determining whether a modification
would be reasonable. Id. at *8. Although schools are not without restraints in reaching that.
decision—namely, they must consider feasibility, cost, and alternative 111,;ki IS 10 achieve the
modification—the court noted that courts generally will not substitute I - judgment for
that of schools. Id. at *6, *8. The reason For such deference, the court . " :s that educa-
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D. The NCAA Deserves the Same Deference Courts Have Afforded to Other
Academic institutions
Although the reasons for providing deference to academic insti-
tutions outlined in Doe should dictate similar deference towards the
NCAA's decisions, in the past, courts have not afforded the NCAA the
same level of deference that they have accorded to schools.269 At least
one scholar espouses a lesser standard of deference towards the
NCAA by categorizing the NCAA's purpose as regulating intercolle-
giate athletics and claiming that the NCAA may not have the expertise
to determine whether a student-athlete with a learning disability can
perform academically in college. 270 Specifically, it. is argued that even
taking into account the experts participating in the individual inquiry
during the waiver request process, because the NCAA assessments are
measured against the standards that the NCAA created—and which
may be more rigorous than those of a member institution—the NCAA
has the sole discretion to prevent a student-athlete with a learning
disability from receiving a college education."'
Such criticism is misplaced, however. 272 First, characterizing the
NCAA's purpose as regulating intercollegiate athletics diminishes the
importance of academics in intercollegiate athletics. 273 In doing so, this
approach ignores that the NCAA's purpose is to integrate college aca-
demics and athletics. 274 Indeed, the NCAA's emphasis on academics is
what prevents collegiate athletics from becoming essentially an amateur
league for professional sports. 275 Furthermore, it is precisely because
the member institutions, the same schools to which courts have af-
forded such deference, were not all upholding their own academic
standards with regard to student-athletes that the NCAA intervened
and implemented academic requirements. 276
 In fact, since the NCAA
implemented its academic requirements, the NCAA has found that
tional institutions, and not courts, are in the best position to determine what modifications
would fundamentally alter their programs. Id. at *8.
269 Compare id. at *4-9 (according deference to a school), with Matthews, 179 F. Stipp.
2d at 1226-27 (demonstrating less deference to the NCAA).
229 See, e.g., Weston, supra note 2, at 1120-21.
221 See id. at 1120-23.
222 See infra notes '273-304 and accompanying text.
2" See Weston, supra note 2, at 1120.
274 See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, supra note 85.
275 See Id.
276 See Baker & Connaugh ton, supra note 92, at 147-50.
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academic achievements of its student-athletes have improved. 277 Fur-
thermore, in the same way that a college's inclusion of moral and ethi-
cal values in its mission statement does not automatically diminish its
stated academic purpose, the NCAA's simultaneous regulation of ath-
letics does not automatically diminish its stated academic purpose. 278
Therefore, to provide the NCAA with a lower level of deference than
courts afford to academic institutions improperly ignores the fact that
the NCAA, like schools, holds academics as central to its purpose. 2"
Additionally, courts should defer to the NCAA's judgment be-
cause, like schools, the NCAA has expertise in the area of academic
requirements.280 Courts traditionally have deferred to the judgment
of academic institutions because those institutions are in the best po-
sition to evaluate academic requirements. 281 In that regard, the NCAA
is no different from schools. 282 The DOJ's consent decree required
the NCAA to install a team of experts on learning disabilities trained
to evaluate student-athletes' waiver applications. 288 Furthermore, the
NCAA has recorded an improvement in student-athlete academic per-
formance after the implementation of the initial eligibility require-
men t.S. 284 That improvement illustrates that the initial eligibility re-
quirements, at least, have achieved their intended effect. 285
Furthermore, it is irrelevant that the NCAA's initial eligibility re-
quirements do not exactly match the admissions standards for all aca-
demic institutions.288 First, because participation in college athletics
increases the number of responsibilities of student-athletes, the NCAA
has determined that to succeed as a student while bearing the bur-
dens of an athlete, most student-athletes must meet a minimum level
277 See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, THE NCAA AND ACADEMIC REFORM, at
lutp://www.ticaa.org/releases/currentTopics/academicReform.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2005). The NCAA  considers its initial eligibility requirements a success because "Whe
overall graduation rates of student-athletes have risen faster than those for the student
body as a whole and the graduation rate for African-American males has dramatically in-
creased over their counterparts in the student body." Id. The NCAA admits, however, that
for some groups of student-athletes—namely, African-American snide basketball players—
the academic success levels continue to concern the NCAA. Id.
275
	 e.g., BosToN COLL. LAW SCH., MISSION STATEMENT, http://www.bc.edu/
schools/law/about/history/mission Oast updated Nov. 20, 2003).
279 See Weston, supra note 2, at 1120-21.
28° See Consent Decree, supra note 119.
251 See Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, at *6-8.
252 See id. at *4-9.
285 See Consent Decree, supra note 119.
2" See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 277.
255 See id.
255 See Weston, supm note 2, at 1120-21.
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of academic aptitude, namely the minimum initial eligibility require-
ments. 287 Second, predicting a student's academic progress, regardless
of the specific standards, is difficult, and the NCAA, like colleges and
universities, can evaluate student-athletes only on criteria such as their
high school performance and accepted standardized test scores. 2" Fur-
thermore, because such calculations cannot always predict a student's
potential achievement, the NCAA's experts conduct individual inquir-
ies into a student-athlete's circumstances and, upon finding that the
student-athlete could perform academically at the college level, may
waive the initial eligibility requirements.289 Therefore, not only does the
NCAA use the same criteria as most colleges and universities to judge a
student-athlete's potential college academic performance, but it also
goes beyond that evaluation to allow for individualized inquiries. 290
Finally, assuming that the NCAA has the same level of expertise
as most colleges in evaluating a student-athlete's potential academic
performance, allegations that the NCAA may prevent a student from
attending the college of the student's choice are both incorrect and
misplaced. 291 The claim is incorrect because the NCAA does not pre-
vent any student from attending college.292 By deeming student-
athletes non-qualifiers, it may prevent some student-athletes from par-
ticipating in intercollegiate athletics and receiving athletic-based
financial aid during their first years. 293 Those restrictions, however, do
not prevent those students from attending the college without par-
ticipating in athletics. 294 Nor do they prevent colleges or private
sources from providing the same students with other forms of aid or
scholarships that are distinct from athletic scholarships. 295 Further-
more, students deemed non-qualifiers during their first years may
qualify to compete in intercollegiate athletics during the remainder of
their college careers—including a possible fifth year of college that
287 See Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass' n, 974 F. Stipp. 459, 466 (D.NJ. 1997).
388 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. '244, 252-54 (2003) (discussing the University of
Michigan's admission criteria for prospective students, including the use of high school
performance and standardized test scores).
289 See NAT'L Cot.t.EGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 91, at 145.
290 See id.
291 See Weston, supra note 2, at 1120-21.
292 See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, supra note 91, at 148.
293 See id.; see also Denbo, supra note 132, at 202-03 (discussing the argument that stu-
dent-athletes should not be allowed to participate in sports during their first years of college).
2" See id.
593 See id.
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would provide a fourth year of athletic eligibility—if they show aca-
demic accomplish men t.296
Additionally, the claim is misplaced because it criticizes the NCAA
for actions in which colleges regularly engage:297 Specifically, the
NCAA's classification of a student-athlete as a non-qualifier because of
a lack of academic achievement is no different than a college denying
a prospective student admission for the same reason. 298 For example,
assuming a student meets the NCAA's initial eligibility requirements,
but fails to meet a college's admissions requirements, the college ad-
missions office makes the final decision on whether the student may
attend that college. 299 Criticism has not centered on the admissions
office's judgment simply because it makes the final decision on admis-
sions." Therefore, as long as the NCAA makes its decision in an
equally as reasoned way as a college admissions office, the fact that it
has the last word on its initial eligibility requirements should not war-
rant any less judicial deference than would be afforded to a college. 30 '
Consequently, because the NCAA shares the same purpose as
academic institutions—namely, maintaining academic integrity—and
because the NCAA maintains a level of expertise in college academic
performance commensurate with many colleges, courts should give
the NCAA the same level of deference they afford to academic institu-
tions when evaluating Title III claims." Courts, thus, should use the
Doe court's interpretation of the Martin standard, ignoring for the
purposes of the evaluation the two-pronged fundamental alteration
test." In that way, the NCAA can protect its mission to maintain both
its academic and athletic standards while continuing to make reason-
able and necessary modifications for individuals with disabilities. 304
CONCLUSION
The ADA provides student-athletes with learning disabilities a
right to demand reasonable modifications to the NCAA's initial eligi-
296 Id.
297 See Weston, supra note 2, at 1122-23.
29N
	
id,
299 See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 91, at 129.
300 See Weston, supra note 2, at 1122-23.
"I See 14.
942 See Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, at *4-9; Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1070-72; Canden, 1996
WL 680000, at *1, *14-16.
303 See Doe, 2003 WL 22097782, at *4-9; see also Martin, 532 U.S. at 682-83,688.
344 See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 91, at 145; NAT'I. COLLEGIATE
MIMETIC ASS'N, supra note 85.
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bility requirements. That right is not without limits, however. The ADA
itself provides that places of public accommodation are not required
to implement modifications that would fundamentally alter the nature
of their services. Furthermore, courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, have repeatedly recognized the im-
portance of that limitation on the scope of Title Ill. Most noticeably,
perhaps, courts have allowed academic institutions to prevail with that
defense, commenting that many modifications could undermine the
scholastic integrity of such institutions. Because the NCAA, like most
schools, maintains a goal of high academic achievement, courts should
provide the NCAA with the same level of deference they provide to
schools. Only then can the NCAA achieve its goal of integrating aca-
demics and athletics, and only then can the NCAA ensure that inter-
collegiate athletics maintain their place in American culture.
KELLY M. TRAINOR
